GitHub Actions at a glance
Aikido Security disclosed the wfx-loot campaign on November 12, 2026: 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts pushed a CI secret stealer into 61,764 repositories, harvesting GitHub Actions secrets, cloud credentials and AI API keys.
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GitHub Actions: status
- Affected
- GitHub repositories writable by one of the 4,837 compromised accounts: 61,764 repositories received probe pull requests, and Aikido identified at least 1,806 where the payload ran
- GitHub Actions secrets and variables, the GITHUB_TOKEN, and OIDC and Actions runtime tokens, plus AWS, Azure and GCP credentials reachable from CI runners
- AI provider and developer-tool credentials stored in CI, including OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Hugging Face, Cursor, Copilot and Codex keys
- Machines that installed Packagist package digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3; the payload also sits in the workflow files of Go module github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278 and v1.0.280
- CVE identifiers
- Not published
- Last checked
What changed with GitHub Actions
Aikido Security disclosed the wfx-loot campaign on November 12, 2026. Starting at 12:45 UTC on November 10, an attacker using stolen GitHub credentials from 4,837 compromised accounts opened probe pull requests titled 'docs: dependency audit notes' from a wfx-docs branch in 61,764 repositories — 10,431 of them in repositories the account did not own — and 92% were still open when Aikido published. Where the probe found write access, follow-up commits injected a roughly 1,500-line shell script into GitHub Actions workflows, an npm postinstall hook or a throwaway workflow file, then reverted within a minute and deleted the workflow run and its logs.
Aikido identified at least 1,806 repositories where the payload ran. The script collects GitHub Actions secrets and tokens, AWS, Azure and GCP credentials, and credentials for AI providers and tools — OpenAI, Anthropic, Gemini, Hugging Face, Cursor, Copilot and Codex among them — then escalates into cloud accounts and plants persistence designed to survive rotation: it rewrites an AWS role's trust policy to open it to any AWS account, and injects Azure federated identity credentials named wfx-ci- so workflows can authenticate without stored secrets. The payload also reached the Packagist package digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3 through automated publishing. Aikido assesses wfx-loot is a different actor from October's GhostAction campaign, despite overlapping victim accounts.
How to fix it: GitHub Actions
1. Monitor
Check every repository you can write to for the campaign's traces: a wfx-docs branch, a pull request titled 'docs: dependency audit notes', commits titled 'ci: refresh build cache', 'chore: add ci helper' or 'chore: add dependency audit workflow', short-lived chore/ branches, and missing workflow run numbers — the attacker deletes runs, so a gap in the numbering is often the only sign.
aikido.dev (opens in a new tab)2. Configuration
If the payload ran in a repository, rotate every secret and credential its workflows could reach — GitHub Actions secrets, cloud keys and AI API keys — and review access on the accounts that opened the probe pull requests, which are compromised.
aikido.dev (opens in a new tab)3. Configuration
Remove the persistence that survives rotation: check AWS IAM role trust policies for a principal opened to any account and Azure AD applications for federated identity credentials named wfx-ci-, and delete any you did not create.
aikido.dev (opens in a new tab)4. Update
Remove the affected package versions — Packagist digitalelvis/neuronai-studio 3.14.3 and Go module github.com/onuragtas/docker-env v1.0.278 and v1.0.280 — and treat any machine that installed the Packagist version as compromised.
aikido.dev (opens in a new tab)
Advisories
GitHub Actions in numbers
Values are copied from the linked source on the date shown. They are not IA Compa measurements.
- Repositories that received probe pull requestsas of · Source for Repositories that received probe pull requests: aikido.dev (opens in a new tab)
- 61,764
- Compromised GitHub accounts used in the campaignas of · Source for Compromised GitHub accounts used in the campaign: aikido.dev (opens in a new tab)
- 4,837
Why GitHub Actions matters for businesses
Why it matters: if your business has code on GitHub, this is a checklist, not a headline. Search every repository you can write to for a wfx-docs branch, a 'docs: dependency audit notes' pull request, commits titled 'ci: refresh build cache' or 'chore: add ci helper', and gaps in workflow run numbers — and if the payload ran, assume every secret the workflow could reach is compromised: rotate the AI API keys and cloud credentials, and remove the planted AWS trust policies and Azure federated credentials, because rotation alone does not close those doors. Agencies that manage client repositories inherit the same audit for every client account.
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Sources for this story
- wfx-loot campaign pushes CI secret stealer to tens of thousands of repositories (opens in a new tab)Official
Aikido Security · aikido.dev
Last verified: . IA Compa summarizes public announcements for business readers. We are not affiliated with the companies mentioned. Always confirm details, pricing, and availability with the official source.
- #wfx-loot
- #github-actions
- #ci-security
- #secret-stealer
- #credential-theft
- #supply-chain
- #ai-api-keys
- #github

